By L. Muthoni Wanyeki

The quiet entry into force on May 26 of the treaty creating an African Union out of the Organisation of African Union (OAU) went almost unnoticed by Kenya.

Perhaps understandably so, given the number of sub-regional and regional intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) that Kenya is already a member-state of. For Kenya belongs to the East African Cooperation (EAC), the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

And there is already an undeniable lack of clarity about how these relate to one another. And, too, perhaps the near silence about its transition into the African Union is a reflection of the fatigued scepticism in the OAU itself. Which is a shame.

Because the political and economic dynamics around the creation and signing on to the African Union treaty have been instructive as to the possibilities for achieving the kind of OAU that we would ideally desire.

And "we" here refers both to those of us who still believe idealistically in pan-Africanism as well as to those of us who now believe pragmatically in regionalism so as to engage less uncritically and less from a position of weakness with the processes of globalisation.

Wherever we stand, the entry into force of the African Union is a step forward. And what gave that step impetus is the interesting part of the story. On the one hand were internal developments within the OAU, its specialised agencies and its member states.

Following the genocide in Rwanda, the African Commission on Human and People's Rights put efforts into determining how to expand its limited mandate to act in human rights emergencies.

In a strategic response to the claim by many African governments that human rights were a import from the north, African civil society organisations decided to make more use of the African Charter and the African Commission, our own human rights mechanism.

They increasingly registered as observers with the African Commission and filed several successful complaints about human rights violations in their own countries. The appointment onto the African Commission of respected African human rights workers, the proposed Optional Protocol on women's human rights to the African Charter and the proposed African Court are the results of that shift.

And, on the other hand, were external pressures around those internal developments. Militarily and politically, the disastrous United Nations (UN) interventions in Somalia and Rwanda led to the stand that Africa should increasingly take care of its own conflicts.

The American-backed African Crisis Response Initiative found its legitimating political counterpart in the OAU's Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Mechanism.

African civil society organisations engage with the Conflict Mechanism and also sit on the African Women's Committee for Peace and Development of the OAU. In addition, over the past two years, the governments of Nigeria and South Africa, in particular, made efforts to build broad-based support for renewed efforts towards the creation of a Council for Stability, Security, Development and Cooperation in Africa.

The council, representing a gradualist approach to regional integration, was debated by and lobbied around by a broad range of African trade unions and other CSOs, including African women's NGOs seeking to ensure the mainstreaming of gender concerns in the areas covered by the proposed council of stability.

Finally, at the Heads of State summit in Lome, Togo, last year, the finished council was presented for adoption.

But the real meat and potatoes issues are, of course, where the money lies. Economically, regional integration efforts by the OAU are the logical outcomes of, and responses to, the International Monetary Fund- and World Bank- backed liberalisation processes.

These paved the way for newer obligations to ensure World Trade Organisation-compliance in all bilateral and multilateral trade and investment agreements.

The result is that, for example, the American African Growth and Opportunities Act and the recently re-negotiated Lome Agreements between the African Caribbean and Pacific and the European Union implicitly (and, in the former case, explicitly) necessitate further opening up of our borders to create larger markets.

From a less reactive perspective, at both relevant UN decision-making bodies and the WTO, the OAU has the capacity to play a role in bringing the Africa Group together to formulate common positions before engaging from within the Group of 77, the negotiating block to which we belong.

This is a role that is of increasing importance given that economic decision-making rests outside of our borders and within these IGOs.

Enter the government of Libya. At the OAU's Heads of State summit, the outcomes of the Special Session were presented in the form of a proposal for an African Union. Somewhat irregularly because this proposal had not been agreed upon during the preceding Council of Ministers' meeting.

And unlike the CSSDCA, this document had not been circulated among African parliamentarians, trade unions and other CSOs and little input had been made to it, particularly in terms of gender. African media attention may have focused on the Libyan caravan across the Sahara to Togo and on the Bedouin-style tent set up by the Libyan Head of State outside the official venue for the Heads of State Summit.

But the real story was that both the CSSDCA and the African Union proposals were adopted, although their approaches to regional integration are somewhat contradictory. However, with Libya having settled the dues of several member states and having provided, together with Nigeria, the funding for Togo to host the Heads of State Summit, this joint adoption was perhaps inevitable.

Which brings us to the present. In July 2001, the OAU shall be finalising its transition to the African Union and selecting a new Secretary General at its Heads of State Summit in Lusaka, Zambia.

The five candidates for the position of Secretary General approved by the OAU include Theo Ben Gurirab, Namibia's Foreign Minister, Arthur Khoza, Swaziland's Foreign Minister, Ibrahima Fall, Senegal's UN Assistant Secretary General for Political Issues, Lansana Kouyate, Executive Secretary of the Economic Community of West African States and Amara Essy, Cote d'Ivoire's former Foreign Minister.

The first woman candidate, Dr Inonge Lewanika-Mbikusita of Zambia, has also presented herself for the position. Despite her credentials and experience, her being a member of Zambia's opposition prevented the government from formally forwarding her name as a candidate.

The succession issues are therefore as complicated and as deserving of attention as the transition issues. Firstly, the lobbying by African women parliamentarians and CSOs around Dr Inonge Lewanika-Mbikusita's candidacy has raised fundamental questions about gender within the OAU.

As the OAU's senior staff are primarily drawn from the senior staff of African governments' foreign affairs ministries, where African women are under represented, it follows that African women remain similarly under represented within the OAU's senior staff. There are currently no policies in place to address the under-representation of African women within the OAU's secretariat.

The representation of African women of course does not necessarily imply the representation and addressing of gender concerns by the OAU's secretariat. But concrete measures to mainstream gender in qualitative as well as quantitative terms within the OAU itself need to be elaborated and implemented.

Secondly, although the OAU Charter and Rules of Procedure state that the appointment of the Secretary General shall not be subject to regional considerations, until fairly recently it was assumed that southern Africa would take the position of Secretary General.

But the entry into force of the African Union has changed that assumption. All the specialised agencies of the OAU referred to above are not included in the treaty for the African Union. The Heads of State Summit will have to clarify where they will lie under the African Union and how transition will concretely work out.

For this reason, the governments of Nigeria and South Africa are apparently going to propose that Salim Ahmed Salim stay on for a further two years. His role would be to ensure a smooth transition into the African Union and to lay the ground for his succession by Alpha Konare, Mali's President, at the end of Konare's Presidential term and Salim's extended term. In short, yet another third term debate.

The point of all this being that nothing is publicly known about Kenya's position on either the transition of the OAU into the African Union or the succession of Salim. Yet, strange as it might sound to Kenyans, due to the length of time that President Daniel arap Moi has been in power and involved in the OAU, Kenya is seen within the OAU as a repository of the OAU's collective memory.

Kenya therefore has the capacity to play a leadership role at the regional level during these negotiations. And the question is how does our Foreign Ministry intend to exercise that leadership role? And how do we, as Kenyans, intend to make use of this window of opportunity to reform the OAU so as to find a new regional role for the OAU within a changed international political economy.