Recently, Police Commissioner Edwin Nyaseda announced that the Kenya Police Force would become the Kenya Police Service. 

The name change is intended as a signal to Kenyans that institutional reforms are afoot and that the officers are willing to move away from the image of brutality and politicisation associated with the term "Police Force".

A name change, however, does not automatically mean a change in practice or attitude. 

If the Kenya Police Service is, indeed, to become a service, then reform policies currently being developed have to support the creation of a service to be guided by accountability, integrity and respect for human rights, non-discrimination, impartiality, fairness and professionalism. 

The police are charged with the role of maintaining law and order, preserving peace, protecting life and property, detecting and preventing crime, apprehending offenders, and enforcing laws and regulations. 

To carry out these functions, the law has granted the police broad discretionary powers and the right to carry and use firearms. 

The law has not, however, established sufficient mechanisms to protect officers from illegitimate outside influence in performing their duties. Nor has it set up proper mechanisms to hold police accountable for their actions. 

This unaccountability to the law and the public has had its consequences. First, the public perception of the police is largely negative – corrupt, brutal, trigger-happy and, in some instances, themselves criminal. 

Second, the efficiency and professionalism of the police force has been compromised and their ability to manage crime and ensure security has come under question.

Police reforms need to address the issue of accountability as one of the key pillars. Currently, for example, the Executive has the full discretion in appointing and firing the police chief.

Under Section 108(1) of the Constitution, the President has the full authority to appoint the Commissioner of Police. Section 25 enhances this control by stating that every public servant shall hold office at the President's pleasure.

As a result of these two provisions, the President has infinite authority both to appoint or to remove the top police officers.

The law affords Parliament no role whatsoever, even as a consultative body, in appointing or removing the Commissioner. There is no other body to present a slate of candidates for the office to the President or to judge the merits or demerits of a dismissal.

The law sets out no criteria for the President to follow in making an appointment to or ordering a removal from office. These constitutional provisions ensure the police answer only to the single individual who holds the presidency. 

In a recent interview, former Commissioner Bernard Njiinu vividly described his own appointment. It clearly illustrated the substantial degree of personal control by the President over the Commissioner's decisions and actions.

The upshot is that, due this total Executive control, the police have been answerable to the Executive, not to the law. The police have been politicised and used to support and perpetuate the power structure.

For example, in the last decade, the police demonstrated their subservience to the then ruling party, Kanu, by breaking up numerous meetings organised by the Opposition and civil society groups and by harassing the opposition and human rights activists. Kanu members were never harassed, their meetings never broken up.

The substantial Executive control continues. Dr Chris Murungaru stated recently that the police would be allowed to carry out their duties without interference from powerful individuals.

This was a tacit admission that politics has in the past determined police functioning. However, it must be realised that, even in law, the police remain vulnerable to political influence.

The Draft Constitution seeks to introduce security of tenure for the Commissioner and to vest in Parliament the authority to vet appointments to this post.

There should also be provisions outlining how the head of the Police Service is to be appointed or removed. Security of tenure will help to ensure that the police are functionally independent of the Government and, therefore, more likely to be accountable to the law.

However, provisions on appointing and removing the police head are not, by themselves, sufficient to ensure the police perform their role impartially or are accountable for their actions.

The police have, in their submission to the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission, recommended a Police Service Commission. 

Such a commission is necessary to ensure independence and accountability. It ought to be set up under the new Constitution as an independent civilian body with the power to monitor police performance and independence of action. 

It should also ensure professionalism in the service by laying down and implementing guidelines for democratic policing. 

As a body charged with monitoring police performance, the commission must enjoy the authority to receive and investigate complaints against police and make recommendations for action against offenders.

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Ms Kagari is a project officer on the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative's Police Reform Programme