That there were no less than three groups intending to overthrow the government during the month of August in 1982 was the most intriguing evidence to come out of the court martial at Langata Barracks of ringleader Senior Private Hezekiah Ochuka. Now, security sources have revealed to The EastAfrican that not only were there three groups of plotters, the coup of August 1 was actually the second one attempted by Ochuka's group.

Ochuka's cousin, John Nyakwar Otiya, an employee of the External Telecommunications Corporation (Extelcomms) department, told the court martial that Ochuka had sought his assistance in getting access to vital external telephone equipment. On the eve of the coup, he said, he took two of Ochuka's companions to Extelcomms House on Haile Selassie Avenue. Without elaboration he said he heard the two men say "there were two groups intending to overthrow the government."

In its extensive coverage of the abortive coup, Africa Now magazine raised the same issue a month later, quoting sources to the effect that "plots had been hatched by three groups in the armed forces." The magazine reported that the first group had planned its coup attempt for August 3, to coincide with the departure of President Daniel arap Moi for the Tripoli OAU Summit, while a second group had timed its coup for the president's return to the country, either on August 7 or 8.

Africa Now added that the two groups were the brainchildren of two rival Cabinet ministers, although one had been planning the action for several months. "But a third group got wind of these plots and decided to throw a spanner in the works because neither minister was acceptable as a suitable alternative to Moi," the magazine wrote.

It was the third group that decided, as early as April 1982, to strike on August 1, hoping that it would get massive support from the rank and file of the armed forces, who were also not too keen on seeing either of the two ministers as head of state. The magazine claimed that the army, the air force and the police had known about these plots at least 10 days earlier.

In his evidence to the court martial trying Major General Peter Kariuki, Lieutenant General J.M. Sawe, who was Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, testified that on July 14, Kariuki had personally made a report to him and General J. K. Mulinge of a group planning a coup within the Air Force.

"General Kariuki had told the Chief of General Staff that he had received information from Nanyuki that Sergeant Ogidi was planning a coup, and that the information had been given [to him] by Lt Mwambura," Sawe said

Lt-Gen Sawe went on to suggest that Lt. Mwambura could have been trying to curry favour because his past record was very bad. He added that a year earlier, the case of Muthemba had been mishandled by the military intelligence and therefore, this case was to be forwarded to the Police Special Branch, for investigations.

Kariuki was instructed to get Lt Mwambura and Sgt Ogidi to the police special branch immediately. This information was corroborated by a Commander of the Nanyuki Air Force base, Col Felix Ngungu Njuguna, who told the Court Martial that on the same July 14, an intelligence officer, Captain Kamau, had told him that Lt Mwambura had some sensitive information.

After Mwambura repeated his information in the Colonel's office, "I immediately took the hot-line and informed the commander of the report. I told him that Lt Mwambura had reported that one Sgt Ogidi, wanted to recruit him to join a group planning to disrupt the Kenya government."

The Africa Now report said the third group initially received solid support from Langata and Kahawa barracks when it swung into action on August 1. Apparently, it had planned to rule for a month during which presidential and parliamentary elections would be held to hand over power to civilians.

At 6.30 am on the morning of the coup, however, divisions arose within the group over who would take overall control, with several names for the interim leadership, including that of General Mulinge and Maj Gen Kariuki, the Air Force commander, being rejected for "doubtful loyalty." Maj Gen Kariuki was also viewed as being too close to the second group while Lt-Gen Sawe was dismissed as a Moi protege.

Not only were there three groups of plotters, the coup of August 1, as we said above, was actually the second one attempted by Senior Private Hezekiah Hezekiah Ochuka's group of Kenya Air Force servicemen, insiders have revealed.

After the first plot was uncovered, the implicated soldiers in the Kenya Air Force were arrested, the matter handled internally by the armed forces, and the position was "as you were," and life continued.

'Affirmative shopping': Over 1,000 shops, warehouses and other premises were looted during the coup

Sizing up the official reaction to their subversive plot, the same group apparently reorganised itself in a much more polished manner, as they already knew where the weaknesses were. 

The abortive coup was sparked off at 2 am, according to Ochuka’s own account, shortly after midnight on Sunday, August 1, 1982 at the GADU (Ground Air Defence Unit) base in Embakasi. 

Army top brass told a court martial that the coup plans had been leaked to the authorities at least two weeks before the attempt was made. Other reliable sources confirmed that Air Force servicemen were talking openly about the impending coup long before they staged it.

Sources indicated that both the Military Intelligence and the Kenya Police Special Branch were consulting over the matter, and that they believed they knew when the servicemen would strike. Apparently, those responsible for stopping the coup underrated the actors and firmly believed such a coup would be impossible to execute given the elitism of the Kenya armed forces, only to be caught with their pants down.

A Cabinet minister, G.G. Kariuki, who accompanied President Moi at the ASK Show at the Ruring’u Showground, Nyeri, on July 30, was quoted in the Andrew Morton book, Moi: Making of an African Statesman, as saying that when he looked up during the KAF jets' fly-past, he was comforting himself that the coup plotters had already been rounded up.

The entire machinery of government, including Police Commissioner Ben Gethi, was aware that something was about to happen, and seemed to have taken precautions by deploying the GSU Companies from their scattered bases in the republic to within the city of Nairobi and its periphery, under the guise of undertaking refresher courses as they waited for the moment of truth.

Members of the national security and the defence forces swung into action as the first reports of the coup emerged. Nevertheless, reinforcements had to be brought in to counter the insurgents. The military units which were in Kacheliba in northern Kenya for a joint military exercise with the Kenya Air Force during the period ending the weekend of July 31, were rushed to Nairobi to capture the Eastleigh Base as the coup was in progress.

Ironically, the Kenya Air Force men who had returned to Eastleigh Base from the military exercise during the afternoon and night of Saturday, driving down the Nanyuki/Nairobi highway, had decorated their vehicles with green twigs and were in obviously high spirits. Their jubilation heralded the pending coup attempt. 

It was not an easy task for the Kenya army battalions to capture the Eastleigh Base, the nerve centre of the "people’s redemption council," who were using its sophisticated communications network to direct and organise the rebel forces in the city and at Nanyuki air base. Their other command post was in a house on Ngong Road, one officer who was in this operation later said.

The army authorities at the DOD command post ordered the rebel soldiers to surrender in the early afternoon of the coup after the recapture of the VoK and other installations from the rebel forces.

But the rebels at Eastleigh Base merely taunted the army over the radio, calling them toothless bulldogs. Thereupon, Sawe ordered the Eastleigh base communications centre destroyed to cut the rebels' communications lines and ordered one of the GADU helicopters sent out to bomb it. The copter-launched missiles scored direct hits on the centre, sending the rebels inside fleeing with their clothes ablaze.

"Some of them dashed to their houses and came out immediately with white bedsheets tied to long sticks to signal that they were surrendering. Then the armed forces moved in and rounded them up," recalled a senior officer who was involved in the operation. It was at this juncture that Ochuka and one of his lieutenants fled to Dar es Salaam to evade capture. 

Another group of the army men moved on the Ngong Road command post, set up in a civilian dwelling, and rounded up those found inside.

Observers in the armed forces were quick to comment that the situation would have been completely different had the officers backed the coup plot.

Those forced to fly jets loaded with bombs with instructions to drop them on State House, JKIA, Parliament Buildings, the president’s home at Kabarak, instead performing complicated manoeuvres in mid-air, disorienting the gunmen guarding them in the cockpit, and ended up dropping the bombs on the Mt Kenya or Aberdares forests.

The officers then assured the servicemen they had bombed all the targets as directed.